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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy on liquidity
creation of commercial banks and if the effect is conditional on
bank size. The paper uses a dataset covering 23 Vietnamese com-
mercial banks during the period 2007–2017 collected from various
sources including State Bank of Vietnam, International Monetary
Fund, SNL Financial database (provided by SNL Company), Viet-
nam General Statistic Office and banks’ annual reports. Different
econometric techniques are employed to analyse the data. Obtained
results indicate that a contractionary monetary policy could lead to
a decrease in bank liquidity creation. This result is less pronounced
with larger banks. In particular, among three monetary policy instru-
ments employed in Vietnam, an increase in the base rate is sig-
nificantly associated with a contraction in bank liquidity creation;
open market operations may have a marginal impact while required
reserve ratio is ineffective because of its unchanged value through-
out the period of the study. This paper is among the first, providing
an insight into eachmonetary policy instrument’s role in influencing
bank liquidity creation in the context of an emerging economy.
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Monetary policy is conventionally themain instrument for a central bank to steer the econ-
omy in the desired direction. It plays an important role in the economic growth, inflation
control, cost and availability of credit and keeping the balance of payment in equilibrium.
Thus an understanding of monetary policy transmission is an important research question
for both policymakers and academic community (Hussain & Bashir, 2019).
Various factors play a role in monetary policy transmission, which has implications for
the real economy. The extent to which these policy actions can be transmitted into the
desired changes will depend on the functioning of the banking system. In particular, it
subjects to the ability to create liquidity of commercial banks. Research on the effective-
ness of monetary transmission from the central bank to the banking system is relatively
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scant, and little is known about factors influencing this mechanism. Berger and Bouwman
(2017) is a rare study in this direction, but its focus is on the US. The fact that banking sys-
tems in emerging countries are generally more diverse and lacking strong institutional and
regulatory bodies could elicit different impacts on the monetary policy and bank liquidity
creation nexus.
Our study is intended to contribute to this niche by conducting a critical assessment
of how monetary policy affects bank liquidity creation and whether bank size matters in
an emerging economy, Vietnam. We aim to obtain the data of all 46 commercial banks in
Vietnam from various sources including State Bank of Vietnam, International Monetary
Fund, SNL Financial database (provided by SNL Company) and banks’ annual reports.
Because of the missing data problem, the final dataset consists of 253 observations of 23
Vietnamese banks during the period 2007–2017.Weuse the fixed-effect (FE) and two-stage
least square instrumental variable (2SLS IV) to analyse the data. We find that the contrac-
tionary monetary policy could lead to a decrease in bank liquidity creation. This result
is less pronounced with larger banks. In particular, among three monetary policy instru-
ments employed in Vietnam, an increase in the base rate is significantly associated with a
contraction in bank liquidity creation; open market operations exert a negligible impact
while required reserve ratio is ineffective because of its unchanged value over the period of
study. The obtained results are robust to different estimation models and methods. These
findings serve as an essential guide to policymakers and researchers on monetary policy
and banking issues.
Our study contributes to the literature on monetary policy and bank liquidity creation
nexus by providing a critical assessment of monetary policy’s impact on bank liquidity
creation in an emerging economy. Although some conceptual studies have suggested the
possible impact of monetary policy on bank liquidity creation (e.g. Shin, 2005), empiri-
cal evidence is scant. While the work of Berger and Bouwman (2017) is so far identified
as the unique empirical study in this direction, it is confined within the context of the
US, a developed country. By contrast, we consider an emerging economy whose market
structure is far different from that of a developed economy in several aspects. Moreover,
as suggested by Meslier et al. (2014) and Wong and Deng (2016), these countries’ banking
sectors have experiencedmany liberalisation reforms and deregulation, especially after the
recent global financial crisis. This changing environment makes the study on monetary
policy’s impact on bank liquidity creation in emerging countries interesting and increas-
ing importance. Hussain and Bashir (2019) provide a useful finding into the role of various
factors in the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in an emerging econ-
omy, China. However, they only focus on bank loan growth rather than bank liquidity
creation. Another study, Le (2019), provides some fundamental background on bank liq-
uidity creation in Vietnam. Still, this study investigates the interrelationship between bank
capital and liquidity creation of the Vietnamese banking system rather than the effects of
monetary policy on bank liquidity creation.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Bank Liquidity Creation
According to Yeager and Seitz (1989), liquidity is a financial institution’s ability to meet
all financial demands. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) defines bank
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liquidity as the bank’s capability to fund increases in assets and satisfy obligations at short
notice with little acceptable losses (BCBS, 2009). To compute bank liquidity, many empiri-
cal studies (e.g. Bunda&Desquilbet, 2008; Distinguin et al., 2013) employ ratios calculated
from accounting data such as a ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Nevertheless, using
such liquidity ratios could be imprecise under certain circumstances such as the Southeast
Bank of Miami case. Despite having liquid assets to total assets above 30%, that bank went
bankrupt due to its inability to repay some liabilities claimed on-demand with its liquid
assets (Distinguin et al., 2013).
To deal with such issues, Deep and Schaefer (2004) construct a liquidity transformation
measure to proxy for liquidity creation. They define the liquidity transformation gap or
‘LT gap’ as the ratio of the difference between a bank’s liquid liabilities and liquid assets
to its total assets. In their work, they consider all assets and liabilities that mature within
one-year liquid but exclude loan commitments and other off-balance sheet activities due
to their contingent nature. The ratio yields values between +1 and −1, indicating the
amount of maturity transformation a bank performs. It thereby captures ‘classic’ banking
business activities in creating liquidity. At the gap value of +1, a bank turns all deposits
into assets that are not liquid (assuming that a bank is funded solely through deposits).
In this case, the bank is likely to perform ‘perfect’ maturity transformation, meaning that
it will turn all deposits into an asset with greater maturity. A LT gap value of 0 indicates
that a bank only creates liquid assets with its deposits and, therefore, does not perform
any maturity transformation at all. The ratio is negative when a bank holds more liq-
uid assets than deposits, signifying that it would tap additional funding sources to hold
liquid assets. The bank will extract liquidity from the market and hence perform nega-
tive maturity transformation. This method shows: (1) the absolute amount of liquidity a
bank creates for the economy and (2) the amount of maturity transformation the bank
performs to create this liquidity. Two kinds of liquidity creation can be captured in this
method. By transforming the maturities of deposits when turning them into loans, banks
create additional cash for the economy. Depositors are offered readily available with-
drawals for their accounts, and borrowers are offered contemporaneously long-term cash
through loans.
Drawing on the use of liquidity transformation to measure liquidity creation, Berger
and Bouwman (2009) develop a comprehensive set of indicators. To construct their liquid-
ity creation measures, they classify all bank assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet
activities as liquid, semiliquid, or illiquid. After assigning weights to the activities clas-
sified earlier, they construct four liquidity creation measures by combining the activities
as classified and weighted previously in different ways. The measures classify all activities
other than loans by product category (i.e. ‘cat’) and maturity (i.e. ‘mat’). To assess how
much liquidity banks create on the balance sheet versus off the balance sheet, they alter-
natively include off-balance-sheet activities (i.e. ‘fat’) or exclude them (i.e. ‘nonfat’). The
measures developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) have been the most widely accepted
and employed in bank liquidity research so far.
In this paper, we employ the liquidity creation measurements developed by Berger and
Bouwman (2009) to proxy liquidity creation.More details about the calculation of liquidity
creation of Vietnamese banks are discussed later.
A significant amount of empirical research has focused on determinants of bank liq-
uidity creation of which bank characteristics such as bank capital and bank size have been
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widely examined. However, research focusing on the effect of monetary policy on bank liq-
uidity creation is limited. Berger and Bouwman (2017) is a rare study in this direction, but
its focus is on the US. The fact that banking systems in emerging countries are generally
more diverse and lacking strong institutional and regulatory bodies could elicit different
impacts on the monetary policy and bank liquidity creation nexus. Hussain and Bashir
(2019) provide a useful initial finding into the role of various factors in the bank lend-
ing channel of monetary policy transmission in an emerging economy, China. However,
the authors only focus on use loan growth to proxy bank lending capacity. Loan growth
is insufficient to reflect the ability of commercial banks to create liquidity for an economy.
This is because bank liquidity creation is the bank’s capability to fund increases in assets
and satisfy obligations at short notice with little acceptable losses.
2.2. Monetary Policy Instruments
Monetary policy is a macroeconomic policy conducted by a central bank or other reg-
ulatory committees to adjust the size of the money supply into an economy. Monetary
policy affects bank deposits, hence bank loan supply and consequently, bank liquid-
ity creation. Some studies (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Kishan & Opiela, 2000) argue that
tight monetary policy changes the return on deposits which alter householder’s prefer-
ence to hold it instead of depositing in banks. According to Hussain and Bashir (2019),
some other authors (Cantero-Saiz, Sanfilippo-Azofra, Torre-Olmo, & LópezGutiérrez,
2014; Disyatat, 2004) propose somewhat different opinion on the link of bank deposits
and bank lending after monetary policy contraction. Disyatat (2004) suggests that bank
deposits may be irrelevant to reduce bank lending following monetary policy contrac-
tion if three elements (Fiat money, sufficiently capitalisation, and liberalised financial
system) exist. Under such conditions, the bank can fulfil loan demand without reduc-
ing loan supply. In other words, Disyatat (2011) underscores the relationship between
loan supply from bank deposits but appraise the role of the balance sheet, risk posi-
tion and market funding premium that amplify bank lending channel of monetary policy
transmission.
Along this line of arguments, monetary policy is assumed to regulate bank liquidity cre-
ation of the whole banking system. Existing monetary policy literature (i.e. Ashcraft, 2006;
Bech & Keister, 2017; Distinguin et al., 2013; Hussain & Bashir, 2019; Keister, 2019; Peek
& Rosengren, 1995) identifies three instruments that a central bank can use to implement
its monetary policy. The instruments are the base interest rate, required reserve ratio and
openmarket operations. In developed economies, central banks conventionally use interest
rates as the main policy instrument. In contrast, in emerging markets, some non-interest
rate instruments (e.g. reserve requirements) are often employed to serve as a complement,
or even substitute, of interest rate-based monetary policy (Chen et al., 2017). For example,
the State bank of Vietnam (SBV) has employed all three instruments to implement itsmon-
etary policies (SBV, 2020). Possible explanations why central banks in emerging economies
such as SBV prefer to use both interest and non-interest base instrument are as follow. In
emerging economies, monetary policy is often employed with multiple aims, such as curb-
ing inflation, stabilising exchange rates and promoting economic growth while banks still
constitute the dominant part of the financial system and serve as themajor financing source
in most emerging economies (Chen et al., 2017). Using all three instruments can help
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enhance the implementation ofmulti-purposemonetary policy of emerging economy gov-
ernments. In the following parts, we will examine how these three monetary instruments
implemented by SBV affect liquidity creation by commercial banks in Vietnam.
2.2.1. The Base Rate
The base rate is the interest rate that the central bank charges for the loans it provides
to commercial banks. It is also known as the base interest rate. It is the main monetary
policy tool (Gertler & Karadi, 2013; Lucchetta, 2007). In emerging economies, the lack of
diversified security products together with an under-developed corporate bonds market
and a low freedom level of capital mobility makes the central bank’s financing a critical
source of banks’ money supply. Hence, a change in the central bank’s base rate is likely to
cause a change in the lending and deposit rates applied by banks.
When the central bank sets a higher base rate, commercial banks will probably increase
lending and deposit rates. Given that firms in emerging economies are mostly credit con-
strained, perhaps a change in banks’ lending rate does not affect much the demand for
a fund from businesses. They still need capital to expand their operation, serve orders
from overseas markets, or meet increasing domestic demand. However, a change in banks’
deposit rate likely leads to a change in savers’ behaviours. When the deposit rate is high,
savers will depositmoremoney in banks, which leads to higher financial liability that banks
may have to pay in short notice. Hence, an increase in banks’ deposit rate will likely lead to
higher liability and decreases bank liquidity. In sum, an increase in base ratemay result in a
decrease in bank liquidity. In the same vein, Shin (2005) develops an analytical framework
showing that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating the bank-
ing crisis, resulting from a decline in the commercial banking system’s liquidity. Taken
together, we expect that an increase in base rate may result in a decrease in bank liquidity.
2.2.2. OpenMarket Operations
A central bank gets involved in open market transactions to regulate the money supply in
its economy through tendering (buying or selling) short-term government bonds. These
tenders are not always implemented in regular auctions where commercial banks could bid
at different rates. They are the so-called fixed rate tenders in which the central bank sets the
interest rate, and commercial banks bid merely for the amount they want to get at that rate
(Bindseil, 2005). Kashyap et al. (2002) suggest that the central bank’s open market opera-
tions can affect the liquidity of the banking system. It is often argued that central banks in
developing countries may increase their holding of long-term public/private securities or
bonds, leading to a change in the amount of liquidity at commercial banks (Bech &Keister,
2017; Keister, 2019).
When the central bank buys bonds in the open market at an attractive rate, commercial
banks are likely to sell bonds and hence have more cash available to lend. These practices
lead to more lending to businesses and thus, more liquidity created by banks. When banks
have more cash available, their demand for deposits decreases and leads to lower liability
and higher liquidity, by contrast, when the central bank sells bonds in the open market at
an attractive rate, banks will buy bonds and have less cash available to lend and, hence,
there is less liquidity created by banks. These practices can also lead to more demand for
deposits, resulted in higher liability and lowered liquidity. Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect an increase in the net amount of bonds bought and sold by the central bank in the
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open market may be positively correlated with a bank’s cash availability or higher bank
liquidity creation.
2.2.3. The Required Reserve Ratio
The required reserve ratio is the ratio of cash to total deposits which the central bank orders
commercial banks to hold to settle financial obligations. It is a primary instrument that the
central bank uses to manage commercial banks’ liquidity. Reserves do not yield any return
to banks. Holding required reserve reduces the number of funds available for investment
and, hence, the expected returns and liquidity (Bashir, 2003). This situation is more likely
to happen in emerging market economies where getting financed from the capital markets
is often not easy because of their under-developed stage. Banks in emerging markets are
expected to decrease lending when the central bank sets a higher required reserve ratio.
In other words, we anticipate that an increase in the required reserve ratio in emerging
market economies means that the bank has less cash to lend, leading to less earning from
lending, and lower capability to settle its financial liabilities in a timely fashion.
2.3. The Role of Bank Size in the Link BetweenMonetary Policy and Bank Liquidity
Arguably, the monetary policy-liquidity creation nexus is likely to be dependent on bank
size. This hypothesis can be explained by the effect of a loosening monetary policy on-
balance sheet liquidity creation as follow.Under a looseningmonetary policy, bank reserves
are increased, leading to a growth of bank deposits and, consequently, greater funds avail-
able for making loans. It can also be the case that the high cost of funds generated from
expensive sources like federal funds is now replaced by a lower cost of funds arisen from
cheaper deposits, which ultimately increases loans. In this context, bank liquidity creation
on-balance sheet has been increased through the lending channel which is consistent with
the view suggested by some previous studies (i.e. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 and Kashyap
and Stein, 1997). It is worth noting that since small banks tend to have less access to capital
markets and aremainly dependent ondeposits, it is reasonable to expect thatmonetary pol-
icy is stronger for this type of bank size. Besides, since small banks are more likely to create
liquidity on-balance sheet (Berger & Bouwman, 2009), we expect that the effect of mon-
etary policy on off-balance sheet tends to be dominated by monetary policy on-balance
sheet. In contrast, since large banks are more likely to create more liquidity on off-balance
sheet, the positive effect on on-balance sheet may be dominated by the ambiguous effect of
monetary policy on off-balance sheet. Hence, we expect that the impact ofmonetary policy
on liquidity creation is stronger for banks with small size and weaker for large banks.
2.4. Research on Vietnamese Banking System
Research on Vietnam banking system is rather limited. Most of them (e.g. Leung, 2009;
Tran et al., 2015) describe the Vietnamese banking system. Doan et al. (2018); Le (2019);
Luu et al. (2019) are a few exceptions that examine drivers of bank efficiency, the inter-
relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital, and financial performance of
commercial banks in the context of Vietnam respectively. However, none of them focuses
on the impact of monetary policy on bank liquidity in Vietnam.
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3. Research Context
Current Vietnam’s banking industry comprises 46 banks of different sizes, ranging from
relatively larger state-owned commercial banks to small privately held banks. Since the
start of economic reform in the late 1980s, the industry has grown tremendously from a
mono-banking system to an extended network of banks and financial institutions. Over the
past 30 years, the Vietnamese government has initiated many banking reforms to improve
the banking system’s efficiency and competitiveness, especially via the privatisation of its
state-owned banks. Many of these reforms have beenmotivated by the country’s entry into
international trade and investment agreements, such as the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade
Agreement in 2001, and its accession to theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007. As
the country gradually deregulates the sector to allow foreign banks’ entry, there has been
an increasing foreign banks presence. There is also some ongoing partial privatisation for
some state-owned commercial banks to comply with the Basel capital accords’ interna-
tional capital standards. However, this process is relatively slow, and banks struggle to deal
with a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) and other structural problems (Tran
et al., 2015).
Before 1990, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) functioned as both a central bank and
a commercial bank. Currently, the SBV’s role is narrowed down to that of a central
bank focusing on the formulation of monetary policies, management of foreign exchange
reserves, and licensing and supervision of credit institutions (a term that encompasses
commercial banks). Meanwhile, financial intermediation functions such as funds mobil-
isation and allocation are shifted to commercial banks. The government implements its
monetary policy through the operations of SBV. The SBV has employed both administra-
tive andmoneymarket instruments to monitor the banking system. According to the State
Bank of Vietnam Law of 2010, the SBV governor decides the use of tools to implement
the national monetary policy, including base rates, required reserves, open market opera-
tions and other measures as stipulated by the government. The SBV provides short-term
capital, or in other words, refinances financial institutions with loans secured by the mort-
gage of valuable papers; discount of valuable papers, and other refinancing forms. The SBV
is active in open market operations which involve selling and buying government bonds.
It also regulates the refinance rate and governs the ceilings for deposit and lending rates
applied by financial institutions. The Communist Party has an exclusive role in governing
the economy, especially in the banking and finance sector, making Vietnam an interesting
emerging economy to study. As a result, this study’s evidence could provide an improved
understanding of the conduct ofmonetary policy instruments in controlling bank liquidity
creation in an emerging market like Vietnam which has so far been under-researched.
4. ResearchMethodology
4.1. Data and Research Sample
To achieve our research aims, we collect data on all 46 Vietnamese commercial banks
from the SNL Financial database in 2007–2017 for the most available and up-to-date data.
SNL Financial, Inc. (SNL) is a company based in Charlottesville, Virginia, the USA that
provides extensive industry-specific financial market data for many public and private
companies worldwide. SNL’s information is considered highly accurate (Carty and Weiss,
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Table 1. Definitions and sources of main variables used in regression analysis.
Variable name Description
Definition and
construction Data Source Source of reference
Liquidity creation FLC, NFLC As described in Table 1 SNL Financial Database Berger and Bouwman
(2009)
Bank size Bank size Natural logarithm of total
assets
SNL Financial Database Horvath et al. (2016);
Angeloni and Faia (2013)
Base rate Base rate The central bank’s interest
rate (%)
IMF Distinguin et al., (2013);
Chen et al. (2017)
Open market
operations
OMO The ratio of the net amount
of bonds sold and bought
by the central bank over
total transactions (%)
State Bank of Vietnam Chen et al. (2017)
Non-performing
loans
NPL The ratio of non-performing
loans to total loans (%)
SNL Financial Database Horvath et al. (2016)
Net interest
margin
NI The lending interest rate
minus the deposit rate (%)
SNL Financial Database Distinguin et al. (2013)
Market share Mshare SNL Financial Database Distinguin et al. (2013)
Bank age Age SNL Financial Database
GDP growth rate GDP GDP growth rate General Statistic of Vietnam
Unemployment Unemp Unemployment rate General Statistic of Vietnam
Trade balance Trade The gap between export
minus import volume
General Statistic of Vietnam
Inflation Inf The inflation rate IMF Horvath et al., 2016
2012). Based on SNL’s company ID, we collect all the data from regulated depositories
defined as commercial banks to create our initial database. However, our final dataset con-
sists of 253 bank-year observations from 23 Vietnamese commercial banks over the 11
years due to the missing data problem.
Most of our variables relating to the banks are computed based on this SNL Financial
database. These include variables capturing liquidity creation, bank size, net interest mar-
gin and non-performing loans. Data for the variable capturing openmarket operationswere
retrieved from the State Bank ofVietnam.1 For other variables relating toVietnam’smacro-
economic data, we gather the data from the General Statistic Office of Vietnam and the
International Monetary Fund. Table 1 summarises our variables and data sources.
4.2. Empirical Model
To investigate the effect of monetary policy on bank liquidity creation and the moderating
effect of bank size on the impact of monetary policy on bank liquidity creation, we develop
an empirical model in which monetary policy, bank size and the interaction variable that
is the product of monetary policy variable and bank size are key predictors. The rationale
for the inclusion of the interaction variables is based on Jaccard et al.’s (1990) work, which
develops the use of an interaction variable to gauge the moderating effect of one indepen-
dent variable on the impact of another independent variable on a dependent variable. We
control various variables related to bank characteristics and macro-economic factors that
potentially affect bank liquidity creation. Because our data spans through the global finan-
cial crisis year with massive financial market collapses in 2008 and 2009, we include crisis
dummy variable to control for crisis effect. We also add a year dummy variable to control
for year effect.
1 The State Bank of Vietnam’s website: https://www.sbv.gov.vn.
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Note that we followAiken andWest’s (1991) procedure for testing themoderating effect
of bank size. We use the mean centring approach suggested by Aiken and West (1991)
to calculate the interaction variable to eliminate the possibility of multicollinearity. The
interaction variable is calculated as below.
Banksizeit∗MPt = (MPt − mean score ofMPt) ∗ (Bank sizeit − mean score ofBank sizeit)
Accordingly, we develop the following equation:
LCit = α + β1MPt−1 + β2 Bank sizeit−1 + β3 Bank sizeit−1∗MPt−1 + β4 Bankcapit−1
+ β5 Marketshareit−1 + β6NPLit−1 + β7 NIMit−1
+ β8 Ageit−1 + β9GDPt−1 + β10 Inflationt−1 + β11 Unemployt−1
+ β12 Year dummyεi + β13 Crisis + εiit (1)
In this formulation, LCit denotes the liquidity creation of bank i at time t. Following
Berger and Bouwman (2009)2 and Le (2019),3 We use two liquidity creation measures:
non-fat liquidity creation (NFLC) for on-balance sheet activities and fat liquidity creation
(FLC) for both on- and off-balance sheet activities. The construction of these measures
is as follows. Firstly, all assets, liabilities, equity and OBS activities are classified as liquid,
semi-liquid or illiquid by category. Secondly, these items are assigned weights according
to the liquidity creation intuition. All else being equal, one dollar of liquidity is created
by investing one dollar of liquid liabilities into one dollar of illiquid assets or illiquid OBS
activities. Similarly, one dollar of liquidity is destroyed by transferring one dollar of illiquid
liabilities or equity into one dollar of liquid assets or liquid OBS activities. Accordingly,
if a bank creates more liquidity, it becomes more illiquid since transferring more liquid
liabilities into illiquid assets. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we assign the weight
of illiquid assets, liquid liabilities and illiquidOBS activities as 1/2, theweight of semi-liquid
assets, semi-liquid liabilities and semi-liquid OBS as 0; and the weight of liquid assets,
illiquid liabilities and liquid OBS activities as −1/2. Note that we classify consumer loans
as illiquid assets since Vietnam’s debt trading market has not developed due to the lack of
a legal system, participants, and the implementation process. As such, consumers’ loans
in Vietnam are not collateralised by any organisation to sell for investors in the form of
securities, making these loans illiquid.
Finally, liquidity creation is calculated according to the formulas below:
NFLC = 1
2
∗ (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities)
+ 0 ∗ (semi − liquid assets + semi − liquid liabilities)
− 1
2
∗ (liquid assets + illiquid liabilities + equity)
2 Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) LC measures have been the most comprehensive and widely employed in this literature so
far.
3 Le (2019), the only work studying bank liquidity creation in Vietnam, uses Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) measures of LC
to examine the causal effects between bank liquidity creation and bank capital.
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Table 2. Liquidity classification and construction of two liquidity creation measures.
Assets




Corporate and commercial loans Cash and due from other
credit institutions
Other loans Trading securities
Fixed assets Derivatives
Other assets Investment securities




Liquid liabilities (weight = 1/2) Semi-ilquid liabilities
(weight = 0)
Illiquid liabilities plus equity
(weight = −1/2)
Customer deposits-current Customer deposits term Senior debt maturing after 1
year
Customer deposits-saving‘ Term deposits from banks Subordinated borrowing
Demand deposit from banks and other credit institutions Other deposits Other funding
Derivatives Short-term borrowing from
banks
Other liabilities
Discounts and rediscounts of valuable papersa Certificates of deposit Total equity
OBS activities




Acceptances and documentary credits reported OBS Guarantees
Committed credit lines
Other contingent liabilities
Sources: Le (2019). Note: The Vietnamese commercial banks ensure to buy back these items within 91 days so they are
categorised as liquid liabilities.
FLC = 1
2
∗(illiquid assets + liquid liabilities + illiquidOBS activities)
+ 0∗(semi − liquid assets + semi − liquid liabilities
+ semi − liquidOBS activities)
− 1
2
∗(liquid assets + illiquid liabilities + equity + liquidOBS activities)
The details of calculations for NFLC and FLC can be founded in Table 2.
MPt−1 denotes a monetary policy instrument employed in year t-1. Specifically, mon-
etary policy instruments include three different sets of indicators: base rate, open market
operations, and required reserve ratio. The base rate (Baseratet−1) is calculated follow-
ing the common practice in the literature (e.g. Bech and Keister, 2017 and Keister, 2019).
As per Bech and Keister (2017) and Keister (2019), the open market operations variable
(OMOt−1) is calculated as the ratio of the net amount of bonds bought and sold by the
central bank over total transactions. In this research, due to the time invariance of required
reserve ratio in our sample data (this ratio is kept stable over the study period), this required
reserve ratio does not show it validity in an empirical analysis of the panel data. Therefore,
we ignore this variable in our regression and focus on the other two.
Bank sizeit−1 is the size of bank i in year t-1. Bank size is widelymeasured in term of total
asset. Larger banks may generate a higher level of liquidity than their small counterparts
(Le, 2019), perhaps due to the advantages of economies of scale or the ‘too big to fail’ belief
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(Berger et al., 2016). Besides, the superior financial capability and the greater access in
finance resources also help banks expand their competitiveness (Fecht et al., 2011). In this
research, we calculated bank measured by the natural logarithm of total bank assets.
Bank sizeit−1 ∗ MPt−1 is an interaction term capturing the importance of bank size in
affecting the monetary policy’s effect on liquidity creation.
Bankcapit−1 is the bank capital structure of bank i in year t-1. A capital structure
that contains a substantial amount of equity can reduce the bank’s vulnerability to mar-
ket freezes; it reduces the risk of contagion to other financial institutions; it reduces the
subsidy provided by deposit insurance; and, shareholders are less likely to be bailed out
by government than debt holders. Hence, bank capital structure is likely to affect bank
liquidity and is widely used as a control variable within the literature on bank liquidity
due to its potential effect. According to the extant literature (e.g. Angeloni & Faia, 2013;
Gale, 2010), bank capital structure is widely measured by the share of total equity to total
assets.
Due to the potential effects of bank characteristics on bank liquidity, we include non-
performing loans (NPLit−1), net interest margin (NIMit−1), market share (Mshareit−1),
and age (Ageit−1) as control variables in the estimation model.
Moreover, a bank’s ability to create liquidity would be affected by the change of macroe-
conomic conditions and/or external shock (e.g. recent global financial crisis). We add
GDP growth rate (GDPt−1), unemployment (Unemt−1) and inflation rate (Inft−1), year
dummy and crisis dummy as control variables in the model to control potential effects of
the macroeconomic conditions. We use log to normalise the values of the variables. α is a
constant, εi is an error term.
4.3. EstimationMethods
For the longitude (panel) data as our dataset, the econometric literature (e.g. Wooldridge,
2013) suggests the use of either a fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE) method first then
other methods such as two-stage least square instrumental variable (IV) to address the
problems associated with endogeneity of a predictor if needed. Given that the formation of
our sample is largely subject to data availability of banks, the FE estimator is chosen ahead
of its RE counterpart.
For our dataset, our key predictors (i.e. monetary policy variables) may not be exoge-
nous. To address this issue, we use 2 SLS IVmethod. In particular, we use the trade balance
(Tradebalancet−1) as an IV for Base rate andOMO4. To promote economic growth, emerg-
ingmarket governments often prioritise their economic policies towardmore export while
limiting import. Theywill likely take trade balance volumewhich is the gap between import
and export into considerationwhenmaking their economic policies such asmonetary poli-
cies. It is also arguable that there hardly a correlation between trade balance and liquidity
creation by each bank. Initially, the correlation matrix presented in Table 3 indicates that
Trade balance is correlated with Base rate andOMO but uncorrelated with FLC and NFLC.
More significantly, the first stage regression results in Table 5 demonstrate that the trade
balance satisfies the conditions for a good IV that is highly correlated withmonetary policy
4 Bank size might be an endogenous variable. However, given the limitation of existing techniques in dealing with multiple
IVs when there is an interaction of variable (e.g. monetary policy∗bank size in our model), we only use an IV for monetary









Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and correlation matrix.
Variables Min Max Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 VIF
1 FLC −15460112 2877186095 131112277 1.000
2 NFLC −20910531 1807641550 111070095 .966∗∗ 1.000
3 Size 146156 52954715 8936751 .278∗∗ .282∗∗ 1.000 8.839
4 NPL .000 8.807 2.197 .031 .058 −.100 1.000 1.198
5 NIM 1.177 8.916 3.237 −.026 −.016 −.019 −.084 1.000 1.237
6 Market 0 .285 .044 −.256∗∗ −.270∗∗ .936∗∗ −.053 −.045 1.000 9.926
7 Age 0 60 21.49 −.109 −.119 .658∗∗ .067 −.184∗ .724∗∗ 1.000 2.318
8 Inflation −.191 22.673 8.75 .032 .007 −.009 .035 .190∗ −.048 −.033 1.000 8.716
9 Trade −18.02 12.20 −2.2300 −.012 −.023 .002 −.065 .004 −.005 −.007 −.652∗∗ 1.000 n/a
10 GDP 5.247 7.129 6.12 .032 .022 .054 −.290∗∗ .013 .055 .007 .295∗∗ −.390∗∗ 1.000 1.841
11 Unemploy 2.100 4.650 3.37664 −.034 −.009 −.016 .060 −.222∗∗ .028 .024 −.388∗∗ −.154 −.277∗∗ 1.000 6.595
12 Baserate 6.25 15.00 8.2273 −.004 −.006 −.030 −.029 .282∗∗ −.084 −.059 .814∗∗ −.490∗∗ .304∗∗ −.360∗∗ 1.000 6.338
13 OMO −.076 .101 .000395 .007 .025 .020 −.214∗∗ −.092 .052 .012 −.426∗∗ −.056∗∗ .506∗∗ .325∗∗ −.178∗ 1.000 2.247
14 Bankcap .03 .96 .108 −.004 .004 −.322∗∗ −.103 .134 −.328∗∗ −.318∗∗ .073 −.014 −.017 −.042 .034 −.027 1.000 1.185
15 Crisis 0 1 .045 .024 .035 −.111 −.177∗ .101 .030 −.263∗∗ .214∗∗ .016 .200∗ −.439∗∗ .284∗∗ .033 1.000 2.965
Notes: FLC is fat liquidity creation (both on- and off-balance sheet activities, in US dollars). NFLC is nonfat liquidity creation (on-balance sheet activities only, in US dollars). Baserate is a base rate. Bank size is measured by the total bank assets (in US
dollars). Bankcap is measured by the ratio of a bank’s equity per total assets. NIM is bank net interest margin. NPL is bank non-performing loans as a percentage of total bank assets.Marketshare is bank share of total market deposits. Age is bank
age measured in years. Inflation is the inflation rate. Trade is the trade balance, measured by the gap between export and import. It is calculated in billion US dollars. Trade balance is used as the instrumental variable for Base rate and OMO not an
explanatory variable in the main models (i.e. the estimation models with FLC and NFLC as dependent variable), so its VIF value was not calculated in collinearity statistics of the main estimation models.
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Table 4. The effects of monetary policy instruments on bank liq-
uidity creation (FE Regression results).
Dependent variable FLC Dependent variable NFLC
Beta p-value Beta p-value
(Constant) .316 .498
L.Baserate −.130 .013 −.083 .024
L.OMO .082 .072 .080 .728
L.Size .227 .044 .137 .034
L.Baserate∗l.Size .108 .042 .100 .033
L.OMO∗L.Size .004 .974 .030 .794
L.Bankcap −.107 .241 −.093 .311
L.Market share −.091 .775 −.194 .545
L.NPLs −.016 .069 −.019 .084
L.NIM −.005 .056 −.024 .097
L.Age .142 .265 .147 .252
L.GDP −.017 .937 −.011 .960
L.Inflation .270 .591 .082 .870
L.UNEM −.113 .725 −.130 .687
Year dummy .442 .318 .300 .500
Crisis .051 .762 .047 .779
R-Square 0.789 0.673
variables but uncorrelated with bank liquid creation. Accordingly, in this research, we first
use FE and report results as baseline models then employ two-stage least square IV (2SLS
IV) for robustness check.
5. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our dataset. As shown, the mean of the dollar
amount of liquidity created by the banking sector isUS$131,112,276 andUS$1,110,700,975
for FLC andNFLC, respectively. Themean value of Bank size is US$ 8,936,751. The average
bank age is 22 years. The average Base rate is 8.2% over the sample period. The average for
OMO is roughly 0.03% with relatively high dispersion. The correlation matrix displayed
in Table 3 shows that the multicollinearity problem in our dataset is not severe. The non-
violation of multicollinearity is further supported by the value of the mean VIFs of less
than 10 (Belsley et al., 2005).
Table 4 shows the estimation results using FE on Equation (1). For each specification,
the results associated with the liquidity creation measure using on-balance sheet activities
(FLC) are first presented before the measure using both on- and off-balance sheet activities
(NFLC). Considering the effect of monetary policy tools on bank liquidity creation, the
coefficient of Base rate variable is negative and highly significant across all specifications.
The effect ofOMO on bank liquidity is positive and significant but not robust (significant at
10% level for FLC and insignificant for NFLC). This suggests that among two instruments
of monetary policies which the central bank applies, the base rate is more effective than
open market operations in monitoring bank liquidity in Vietnam.
With respect to the moderating effect of bank size, the coefficient of interaction
variable Banksize∗Baserate, is significant and positive in all specifications while that of
Banksize∗OMO is positive but insignificant. This suggests that larger banks generally do
not pass through a rate change initiated by the central bank as much as those of smaller
sizes. In other words, the change in base rate is a more effective tool for the central bank to
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Beta p Beta p Beta p-value Beta p
(Constant) .328 .538 .370 .550
L.Baserate −.067 .044 −.039 .037
L.Baserate∗l.Size .095 .041 .073 .077
L.OMO .003 .098 .025 .890
L.OMO∗L.Size .003 .980 .025 .827
L.Size .228 .049 .143 .021 .291 .055 .199 .039
L.Bankcap −.104 .251 −.091 .316 −.100 .265 −.088 .329
L.Market share −.105 .737 −.215 .492 −.131 .627 −.231 .396
L.NPLs −.013 .088 −.020 .083 −.007 .093 −.026 077
L.NIM −.008 .092 −.027 .073 −.002 .098 −.022 .081
L.Age .144 .253 .149 .240 .141 .264 .146 .251
L.GDP .041 .775 .036 .803 .025 .899 .019 .923
L.Inflation .122 .696 −.025 .936 .040 .887 −.075 .789
L.UNEM −.089 .774 −.105 .738 −.111 .728 −.127 .690
Year dummy .342 .330 .217 .539 .379 .373 .254 .552
Crisis .084 .551 .075 .595 .112 .379 .091 .479










Beta p Beta p Beta p Beta p
Trade Balance 0.714 0.000 −0.057 0.0591 .033 .865 −.045 .816
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.843 0.415 0.311 0.426
Notes: In the first stage, we estimate the effect of the instrumental variable on not only our key predictors (Base rate and
OMO) but also our dependent variables (FLC and NFLC). In the second stage, we estimate the effect of each monetary
policy variable using Trade balance as an instrumental variable separately. This is because the current Stata software only
enables the use of instrument variables for more than one explanatory variable at one time.
manage the liquidity of small bank than that of a larger bank. However, the coefficient of
the interaction variable, OMO ∗ Banksize, is insignificant across all specifications, indi-
cating that bank size does not have anymoderating effect on the effectiveness of the central
bank’s transactions in open markets.
Concerning bank size, its coefficient is always positive and significant. This indicates
that larger banks tend to generate a higher level of liquidity as compared to their smaller
counterparts.
Regarding the control variables, the results obtained are highly intuitive. Specifically,
non-performing loans and net interestmargin have negative and significant impacts on liq-
uidity creation. However, bank age and bank share of the deposit market is not a significant
predictor of bank liquidity creation.
Table 5 shows the estimation results using 2SLS IV regressions on Equation (1). The
upper part of the table shows the second stage regression results. The bottom half of the
table presents the first stage regression results. Overall, the second stage regression results
related to the impacts of the base rate, bank size and interaction effect of bank size and base
rate, on bank liquidity reported in Table 5 are consistent with those reported in Table 4,
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indicating that our results associated with these variables are robust. Table 5 shows the
significant effect of OMO on bank liquidity for FLC but the insignificant effect for NFLC,
implying that findings of the negligible impact of OMO on bank liquidity are consistent
across our baseline and robustness check models. The interaction effects of bank size and
OMO on bank liquidity are also insignificant, like those reported in Table 4. Therefore, it
is reasonable to conclude that our findings are robust.
6. Discussion and Implications for Practice
Overall our results show the significant and adverse effect of the base rate on bank liquid-
ity creation, indicating that a tight monetary policy exerts detrimental impacts on banks’
liquidity creation. In contrast, an easedmonetary policy promote banks’ liquidity creation.
Our findings are in line with Chen et al. (2017) who report that banks’ riskiness increases
when monetary policy is eased, based on their empirical examination of more than 1000
banks in 29 emerging economies during 2000–2012.
The possible explanation can be found from the literature of the credit channel which
argues that the number of bank loans may decrease due to a higher interest rate follow-
ing an increase in the central bank’s base rate (Chen et al., 2017). Therefore, our results
support the view that expansionary monetary policy that holds interest rates low enough
could boost bank liquidity creation. This view still holds in the context of an emerging
market, Vietnam. It is believed that due to the less developed stage of the financial market
in an emerging economy, reactions to the central bank’s monetary policies in emerging
economies would be significantly different from those in developed countries. This leads to
a discrepancy between monetary policies’ impacts on bank liquidity in emerging markets
and those in developed countries. However, our study reports the findings somewhat simi-
lar to those by Berger and Bouwman (2017). Analysing the sample of US banks, Berger and
Bouwman (2017) also find a significant and negative effect of monetary policy instrument
on bank liquidity. The effects are also large for small-sized banks and become negligible
for a bigger bank, as reported in our study.
In terms of the central bank’s transactions in OMO, the results show the negative effect
of an increase in the net amount of bonds bought and sold by the central bank in OMO
(or commonly known as loose monetary policy) on liquidity creation. However, the effect
is not robust. To solve this puzzle, we take a careful look at our data of the Vietnamese
banking system. It is revealed that the amounts of bonds purchased and sold, on average,
are mainly on par as the mean OMO is roughly 0.04% over the entire sample period. This
means that any extra liquidity created due to an expansionary policy action will be offset
by an equivalent reduction in liquidity resulting from a contractionary move in the same
year. As a result, there may be changes in liquidity creation over a shorter time horizon
such as monthly or weekly but does not vary substantially over a year.
In brief, our results imply that in general monetary policy takes effect in monitoring
bank liquidity creation. Hence, our results support Acharya and Naqvi’s (2012) sugges-
tion that the optimal monetary policy should involve a ‘leaning against liquidity’ approach.
Central banks should employ a tightening monetary policy when there is excessive bank
liquidity creation to avoid bank risk-taking and apply an easingmonetary policy in times of
scarce liquidity creation to promote investment. However, in Vietnam, not all three mon-
etary policy instruments are effectively used by SBV in managing bank liquidity creation.
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In more advanced economies, central banks conventionally use interest rates as the main
policy instrument. In contrast, in emerging markets, some non-interest rate instruments
are often employed to complement, or even substitute, interest rate-based monetary pol-
icy (Chen et al., 2017). Our study demonstrates that non-interest rate instruments (e.g.
OMO, required reserve ratio) are not useful tools for managing bank liquidity creation.
This implies that if the central bank in an emerging economy aims for market stabilisation,
they do not need to interfere in the financial market with policy instruments like OMO or
required reserve ratio.
Our findings suggest that policymakers in emerging markets should focus on the base
rate to manage bank liquidity creation. Central banks should raise the rate when there is
excessive bank liquidity creation to avoid bank risk-taking and lower the rate in times of
scarce liquidity creation to promote investment. In projecting how much rate change is
needed, they should consider bank sizes. We also advise that for required reserved ratio
taking effect in managing bank liquidity creation; the central bank may need to vary the
ratio over time.
Our study has made an initial step in investigating the effectiveness of monetary pol-
icy in an emerging market. Given that our sample is small and has a short time frame due
to data unavailability, future research should expand the sample size if more resources are
available. Due to the unavailability of monthly or quarterly data for bank liquidity calcu-
lations, our estimations using annual data might not reflect a business cycle and use more
frequent data (e.g. monthly or quarterly). Another research avenue would be to test the
effectiveness of other tools such as Taylor rule deviations or interbank interest rate. All
these suggest a rich future research agenda.
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